After the start of Russia's war in Ukraine, experts have repeatedly stated that Russia's positions in Central Asia may weaken, and China will take the initiative by strengthening economic cooperation. However, two years later, there has been no significant restructuring of regional relations. On the contrary, the parties are expanding their interaction, covering not only politics and economics but also the military sphere. This was discussed by international relations experts on the CAPS Unlock platform, published by Vlast.kz.
According to Temur Umarov, a research fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center, a stereotype has emerged in expert and public discussions that China and Russia set the pace for all political and economic processes in Central Asia, while the regional countries passively follow their course. For example, China allegedly coerces them to vote in favor of its interests at the UN General Assembly.
"Central Asian countries act based on their own pragmatic interests. We underestimate how much our elites control the situation within their own countries. Any action by China or Russia can only occur if the local political regime agrees. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan adopts a law on foreign agents because it needs it itself, not because of Russia," Umarov emphasizes.
An important point in the policy of the region's countries is that they do not want to see conflicts between China and Russia. Therefore, they try to balance their positions, avoiding competition between them. This includes involving third parties in certain issues. For example, besides Russia, Tajikistan asks India for help in ensuring security on the border with Afghanistan.
And this balancing act often allows the Central Asian states to turn potential contradictions between Russia and China to their advantage.
But now, cooperation lines are emerging between Moscow and Beijing in the region, believes Umarov. And they concern not only the economic aspect, for example, uranium industry in Kazakhstan.
In particular, this can be seen in the diplomatic documents they sign. These documents suggest that the two countries will coordinate their actions in Central Asia and prevent the import of "color revolutions" into the region.
Forms of cooperation are also emerging among all parties in the military sphere. Chinese military delegations visit Russian bases in Tajikistan. Or Russia and China conduct joint exercises in one of the countries within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Decisions by Russia or China that could disrupt the balance of their interests in Central Asia may not always be implemented.
As an example, Umarov cited the gas union between Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, through which Russia allegedly wants to become the sole supplier of gas to China. But Russia is unlikely to be able to buy out all the necessary infrastructure for this since part of it belongs to China itself, which has joint ventures with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.
Moreover, the ambitions of both China and Russia are limited by how they are perceived by the population of the Central Asian countries. China seems to many as an external threat, while Russia is seen as a country that violated its own commitments to ensure security in the region with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
This attitude toward Russia is confirmed by a study conducted by Assistant Professor Janibek Aryn of Nazarbayev University. He conducted a series of focus groups to study how citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia perceive the activities of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
According to Aryn's observation, although the organization is not limited to the participation of Russia alone, it is perceived as an instrument of Russian foreign policy. And each side has some claims against the CSTO to some extent.
Just a few years ago, residents of CSTO member states hardly discussed it in the public sphere. Everything changed after the January events in Kazakhstan, the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh.
In Kazakhstan, some citizens have grievances related to the possibility that Kazakhstan could lose its sovereignty during the deployment of CSTO troops in January 2022 to stabilize the situation.
Kyrgyzstan, in turn, was dissatisfied with Russia's unofficial siding with Tajikistan during their border conflict in the same year, 2022.
Armenia is outraged that the CSTO did not defend the country during Azerbaijan's shelling of its territory and the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
"After this, Kazakhs gave a clear answer - they need to withdraw from the CSTO because it gives nothing. In Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, opinions are divided. In Kyrgyzstan, there are two positions: the need to withdraw due to uselessness and inaction. And the second narrative is the opposite, that it is inexpedient to withdraw. In Armenia, it's the same, but there are many people who believe that withdrawal is unnecessary," says Aryn.
According to him, the ambiguous position of Kyrgyzstan and Armenia is due to the fact that these countries see a threat from a third side - from Tajikistan and Azerbaijan, respectively. But opponents of the CSTO in all three countries argue that Turkey could be an alternative to Russia.
Despite this, the question of withdrawal from the CSTO was clearly raised only by Armenia, but so far only as a bargaining chip. The country threatened to draw closer to the European Union if Russia does not change its attitude towards its security commitments.
Umarov believes that in the coming years, there are unlikely to be significant changes in the balance of power between Russia and China in Central Asia.
"As long as the current political regimes exist, coexistence [of all sides with each other] is possible. I think cooperation will only deepen. But we do not know this for sure."
According to the moderator of the meeting, Nargis Kasenova, senior research fellow at the Davis Center at Harvard University, the main point of uncertainty remains major events like the war in Taiwan.
But even Russia's interest in Central Asia may not be as high as it seems.
"If you read Russian experts, there is a strong emphasis on working with the global majority - Africa, Latin America, Arab countries. It is quite possible that they will shift their attention there and will not focus on the countries of the region," noted Kasenova.
But overall, she does not rule out that Russia will start using more soft power in the region. Following the example of the South Caucasus, it can involve local NGOs, political movements, activists, journalists, and other channels in promoting its agenda.
"Much of what Russia does is ineffective, but it has a fertile ground in Central Asia. And it's difficult for China to work here," concluded Kasenova.
Source: Vlast.kz
CentralasianLIGHT.org
March 19, 2024