One of the priority countries for Turkic integration, from the point of view of Turkey, is Turkmenistan. However, Ashgabat has consistently shied away from Ankara's political and cultural projects. Interest in cooperation with Turkey is limited to the economy and certain aspects of military cooperation. Perhaps this will change the non-bloc status of Turkmenistan in the future.
Analytical portal IA Center publishes material from the scientific journal "Russia and the New States of Eurasia", written by Ph.D., Head of the Department of the Near and Post-Soviet East of INION RAS Vladimir Avatkov and lecturer of the Department of Oriental Languages of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry Andrey Ryzhenkov.
Turkey has been actively promoting its interests in Central Asia since the 2000s. In the case of Turkmenistan, relations between the two countries are built on the “One nation, two states” platform, which Ankara uses for countries with which they plan to integrate the deepest.
However, unlike Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan remains a closed country and maintains isolation from political organizations under the auspices of Ankara (like Organization of Turkic States, Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries), declaring comprehensive neutrality. Only at the end of 2021, when the Turkic Council was transformed into an international organization, Ashgabat agreed to the status of an observer state.
Meanwhile, the current turbulence in Afghanistan may become a challenge to Turkmenistan's neutrality. If instability on the Afghan border grows, this may lead to Ashgabat joining one of the military blocs. Turkey can offer Turkmenistan to deepen military cooperation: since the mid-2010s, Ankara, along with Beijing, has been the main supplier of weapons for the Turkmen army. In July 2021, Ankara signed a $37 million contract with Ashgabat for the supply of Bayraktar drones.
The only pro-Turkish organization where Ashgabat officially joined was TURKSOY, an instrument of Ankara's "soft power". However, Turkmenistan distances itself from most of the cultural events of the organization - with the exception of 2015, when the Turkmen city of Merv was declared the capital of the "Turkic world".
Ashgabat restricted the work of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) as an instrument of Ankara's humanitarian influence, and in 2011 Fethullah Gülen's Turkish schools were closed in the country for "promoting pan-Turkism".
The only working tool of Ankara's "soft power" is the education of Turkmens in Turkey itself - in 2021, Turkmen students became the first in number in Turkish universities, leaving even Azerbaijanis behind. However, the question remains whether these students will return to their homeland, becoming the conductors of Turkish culture, or will want to assimilate in Turkey itself.
Turkmenistan and Turkey cooperate most actively in the economy: already in the 1990s, Ankara's share in Ashgabat's foreign trade was from 10 to 16%. Today, Turkmens buy up to 26% of foreign goods from Turkey, which remains the leader of Turkmen imports. However, since the 2010s, China has been leading in Ashgabat’s exports - today 78% of commodity deliveries go to China, the main share of purchases falls on gas supplies.
This situation was facilitated by the development of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, which was opened in 2009 and reached its design capacity the following year. Today, almost all Turkmen gas is consumed either domestically or supplied to China. At the same time, there is no guarantee that China will increase the volume of purchases, given the pricing policy of Turkmenistan and the active competition from Gazprom in the Chinese market.
Ankara, striving for the status of an international energy hub, seeks to redirect part of the supply of Turkmen gas to itself - with the possibility of re-export to Europe. At the end of 2020, the Trans-Adriatic gas transportation route was launched from the Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan to Italy. Turkmenistan is also planned to be included in this system with the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline.
In 2021, one of the main obstacles to construction disappeared: Baku and Ashgabat settled a dispute over an oil field on the Caspian shelf, from that moment it was called Dostlug (Friendship). The second problem is the demarcation of the borders in the Caspian, which was removed at the V Caspian Summit in 2018 in Aktau.
However, the summit agreements will not 100% remove the problem of pipeline construction: the Caspian countries, whose interests are contrary to the supply of Turkmen gas to Europe, will be able to slow down the project, referring to the agreements on environmental protection of the Caspian Sea. In addition, the gas route from Turkmenistan to Italy will be unnecessarily long, and its creation will require significant funds. This could result in Turkmen gas being too expensive to compete in Europe.
Source: IA-Centr.ru
CentralasianLIGHT.org
January 26, 2023